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In earlier studies, the author showed that the type of development
adopted by Chile differed significantly from that of the successful East
Asian countries. Up to 1986, the Chilean economy had a relatively weak
and technologically unsophisticated manufacturing base, and the
penetration of imported inputs was mainly at the expense of the scanty
domestic productive intermediation. Therefore, neither manufacturing
industrialization nor industrial interdependence appeared to facilitate
the type of manufactured exports that might sustain dynamic industrial
development based on external markets. The present paper analyses
changes in Chile’s production structure from 1986 to 1996, generally
extended to 2000, using methods similar to those of earlier studies. The
conclusion is that, despite the outstanding growth rates over the period,
the economy still appears relatively weak as a basis for a sustainable
increase in economic and technological sophistication.
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I
Introduction
This study continues previous work by the author on
the changes in both production structures and
industrial interdependence in Chile between 1960 and
1990 (Albala-Bertrand, 1999a and 1999b). The results
were then contrasted with those of some newly
industrializing countries at comparable stages of
development, with the aim of assessing to what extent
policies based upon the Washington Consensus would
produce economic structures which were generally as
successful as those of countries that had applied the
Japanese/Asian model.
In short, in the last few decades, two main
competing market-oriented policy models for
development have arisen: the Japanese/Asian model
and the Washington Consensus model. Both stress the
importance of macroeconomic stability, export-led
development and private enterprise. They differ
fundamentally, however, as regards the development
roles of the market and the State, and consequently the
range and types of economic policies available (Wade,
1990; Stiglitz, 1996; Chang and Grabel, 2004).
The main emphasis of the Washington Consensus
model is to ensure the liberalization of trade through
the removal of most if not all trade barriers and to
achieve macroeconomic stability via balanced budgets
and privatization and through deregulation and
liberalization in order to allow price signals to operate
efficiently in the economy (Williamson, 1990). The
State is to be reduced to a minimal and subsidiary role.
Economic policies, therefore, are to be neutral and
operate automatically through the market. The extreme
version of this model postulates that market failures
are always less costly than government intervention
and failure, so government is irrelevant in most, if not
all, cases (Krueger, 1990).
The Japanese/Asian Model, on the other hand,
while expressly recognizing the importance of
macroeconomic stability and export orientation, has
some misgivings about the “free market” mechanism.
It considers that the State should have a fundamental
and pivotal role in the direction and speed of
development, especially –but not exclusively– as
regards industrial policy. This means that selective (not
neutral) and regulatory (not automatic) policies are
essential for achieving dynamic (as opposed to static)
and strategic (as opposed to blind) development.
Among other functions, the government should
contribute to the creation of dynamic comparative
advantages via enlightened protectionism, for the
benefit of potential export winners, and to the
coordination of the economy as a whole.1  Even if it
were not directly involved in production activities, the
State would therefore provide a fundamental input in
guiding and streamlining changes in production
structures.
In comparing the two policy models, in his earlier
works the author chose to examine the economies in
which they had been applied most successfully: Chile
in the case of the Washington Consensus model, and
the Taiwanese economy and the Republic of Korea for
the Japanese/Asian model. It was shown that in Chile,
contrary to the situation in the East Asian countries,
and whatever other successes the Chilean experiment
may have shown, both industrial interdependence and
industrialization based on exports of manufactures were
still weak and unpromising as endogenous bases
capable of sustaining dynamic industrial development
led by external markets (Albala-Bertrand, 1999a and
1999b). As late as 1990, at least 15 years after the
beginning of this experiment in Chile, and even
allowing for the differences in initial conditions,
Chile’s economy and production structure significantly
differed from those of the Republic of Korea and the
Taiwanese economy.
The present paper seeks to assess whether there
was any convergence between the respective situations
over the period 1986-1996, which in growth terms was
the most successful ever in Chilean economic history,
with annual growth rates averaging 7%. After 1986,
however, there seems to have been little in the way of
industrial policy in Chile, and the government
generally favoured the prevailing Washington
Consensus policies. This does not mean that the
government did not make an important contribution
to the formulation or correction of policy packages to
derive greater benefit from the strategy being used,
1 See Wade (1990); Chang (1996); Stiglitz (1996 and 1998);
Stiglitz and Uy (1996); Lall (1996 and 1997); Islam and
Choudhury (2000), and Chang and Grabel (2004).
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nor does it mean that there was no public policy aimed
at nurturing certain basic manufacturing industries.2
It does, however, mean that those strategies were neither
systematic nor all-embracing and that they did not favour
the type of industrial policy associated with the
successes of the Republic of Korea and the Taiwanese
economy: i.e., the Japanese/Asian model. To this end,
this paper therefore analyses input-output data for 1986-
1996, generally updating its results to 2000.3
To avoid any misunderstandings, it seems desirable
to clarify the type of structural change that can be
analysed using the methodology described below.
Changes in production structures –the central focus of
this paper– may result from institutional changes or
from growth differentials between sectors in a given
institutional framework. Chile experienced massive
institutional changes between 1975 and 1985, and from
1986 to 1996 it underwent further important changes,
but in more balanced and moderate ways than in the
previous 10 years. The resulting variations in the
composition of gross output, as described in this paper,
relate to the latter period, during which the institutional
framework of the earlier period was mostly retained.
The variations are therefore likely to have a
considerable institutional component, resulting from
both the overall strategy followed since 1975 and the
policy changes adopted during the period 1986-1996.4
Thus, the method used captures some sectoral and
intersectoral changes in the Chilean economy in that
period, in the framework of the prevailing institutions
and policy strategies that may have affected economic
variables such as growth and productivity.
II
Methodology
Chenery (1960) was the first to put forward a
methodology to assess changes in the structure of gross
output. This methodology was based on input-output
tables and was later refined by several authors.5  The
decomposition method actually used in this paper is
closer to that of Wyckoff and Sakurai (1992) and Albala-
Bertrand (1999a). This method of analyzing changes
in production structure capitalizes on most of the
advantages of the input-output approach, while
avoiding most of its limitations: that is, it reduces the
importance of its usual shortcomings for forecasting
(Bulmer-Thomas 1982; Ciaschini, 1988).
One advantage, fully exploited here, is that the
overall structural change over a given period can be
decomposed into the sources of demand which
contribute to the change, both for the industrial
complex as a whole and for each constituent industry.
The sources of demand, however, should not be taken
as explaining structural change in terms of causality
but only in terms of ex-post concomitance. These are
therefore useful empirical foundations for a structurally
comprehensive policy analysis, which would exceed
the scope of this paper.
In turn, the method used in evaluating structural
changes in industrial interdependence –understood as
structural change in internal interactions among
industries at the level of intermediate goods– is based
on multiplier analysis applied to backward and forward
linkages. The main difference between our analysis
and standard linkage analysis is that, in input-output
theory, the standard analysis adopts an ex-ante
approach to the potential for planning economic
expansion (Hirschman, 1958 and 1977; Syrquin, 1992).
In our analysis, however, since our purpose is to analyse
effective changes in structural linkages over time, the
linkages represent the actual or ex-post
interdependence of the economy in 1986 and 1996.
This also greatly reduces the restrictiveness of the
assumptions required for standard analysis.6
Consequently, starting from the standard general
input-output framework, we can arrive at some useful
equations for the purpose of analysing changes in
production structure as well as industrial
interdependence.7  In matrix form, for structural change2 See Achurra (1995); Agosin (1997); Moguillansky (1999)
and Ffrench-Davis and Stalling (2001).
3 For more details, see Albala-Bertrand (1999a and 1999b).
4 See Albala-Bertrand (1996).
5 See, for example, Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982);
Kubo, de Melo and others (1986); Sakurai (1990).
6 See also Albala-Bertrand (1999b).
7 For a full presentation of these models see Albala-Bertrand
(1999a and 1999b).
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we initially use an equation for variations in gross
output, as:
[1]
where ∆X is the variation of gross output, B is an
adapted Leontief inverse, U represents the proportion
of domestic intermediates to total intermediates
(superindex W) and domestic final demand to total final
demand (superindex F), F is final demand, E is foreign
demand and W is intermediate demand. The subindices
“0” and “1” represent the initial and final years (1986
and 1996) respectively. The decomposition of the gross
output growth rate can be obtained by dividing the
equation [1] by X0. Each of the five terms on the right-
hand side of [1], in variation or growth terms, represents
a direct and indirect contribution to total demand for
the gross output of the economy, and has the following
standard meanings:
= contribution of final domestic demand
expansion (FDE);
= contribution of export demand
expansion (EDE);
= contribution of import substitution of
final goods (ISF);8
= contribution of import substitution of
intermediate goods (ISW);
= contribution of changes in direct input-
output coefficients (IOC).9
We then use the following equation for variations
in the share of gross output, as:
[2]
where all the terms have the same meaning as above,
but δ represents the deviation from balanced growth
(that which would have prevailed if all sectors had
grown at the same mean growth rate as the economy).
This is therefore an indication of structural change
through sectoral share changes over the period. The
last three terms on the right-hand side are the same as
before. The meaning is analogous to that of equation
[1], but refers to the absolute value of the share change
(δX) and the relative share change (δX/Xt1), rather than
absolute growth (∆X) and the growth rate (X-1∆X).
To analyse industrial interdependence, we
calculate backward and forward linkages. We define
the backward linkage (BL) as the direct and indirect
dependence of a particular industry on all industries,
as they supply intermediate inputs for its own
production. Dynamic industries are expected to
increase their backward linkages, becoming more
specialized as they develop, either because they need
a greater quantity of a more varied input mix or because
they have ceased in-house production of part of those
inputs. Leading industries with strong vertical
integration are therefore expected to exert a pull on
the economy and, if they are technologically advanced,
increase the technological sophistication of the overall
economy. In matrix notation, backward linkages (BL)
are expressed as:
BL = i’C-1 (backward linkage, row vector) [3]
where C-1 is a Leontief inverse. Theoretically, dynamic
leading industries are expected to exhibit above-
average linkages and more equal distribution than
other industries.
Finally, to assess how the backward linkages
change over time, we simply calculate the first
difference of their values between any two given years.
However, as the matrix C contains both domestic and
imported intermediates, a decomposition is necessary
to discriminate between the two. Thus:




where A is a standard matrix of input coefficients. The
superindices d and m stand for “domestic” and
“imported,” respectively. Equation [4] is a row vector
of backward linkage differences between two years,
“0” and “1”, decomposed into domestic and imported
contributions. This can be more usefully presented in
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8 Terms 3 and 4 are positive when there has been an increase in
import substitution over the period. Conversely, a decrease in
import substitution means an increase in import penetration.
9 This represents the variation in demand over the period,
exclusively as a result of variations in the input-output coefficients
of the system, weighted by the average of X1. If this term is
positive for a particular industry, then this means that a greater
proportion of the output of that industry is used as input for the
production of other industries than in the base year. That is, it
represents an increase in the contribution to direct intermediation
by that industry with regard to the economy. As such, it represents
a version of direct backward linkages (demand) from the rest of
the economy to that industry, or alternatively a version of the
direct forward linkage (supply) from that industry to the rest of
the economy over the period (Hirschman, 1977).
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equation [4] by the value of BL for the initial year, as
shown in table 1 below.
Analogously to backward linkages, we define
forward linkages (FL) as the direct and indirect
dependence that all industries have on a particular
industry, because they require intermediate inputs from
it for their own production. Given that there is no reason
why BL and FL should be similar, we have to calculate
the value of FL to obtain a more complete picture of
overall intermediate transactions. The procedure for
doing this is fully analogous to that for BL. Then, in
matrix notation, forward linkages (FL) are expressed as
follows:
FL = C*-1i (forward linkage column vector) [5]
where C*-1 is a Leontief inverse of direct and indirect
input supply (rather than demand) coefficients. Again,
we expect the leading industries to exhibit more evenly
distributed above-average linkages than other
industries.
Lastly, the decomposition of the first difference of
[5] yields the following ∆FL decomposition:




where A* is a matrix of direct input-supply coefficients
and the superindices d and m stand for “domestic” and
“imported,” respectively. This equation is a column
vector of forward linkage differences between two
years, “0” and “1”, decomposed into domestic and
imported contributions. As in the previous case, this
can also be more usefully presented in terms of growth
rates (or rates of change) by dividing equation [6] by
the value of FL for the initial year.
III
Analysis of results
For this purpose, we used a 28-industry disaggregation,
plus some relevant subgroups. The analysis focuses on
the period 1986-1996, generally contrasting it with
the earlier period 1977-1986 analysed previously by
the same author (Albala-Bertrand, 1999a and 1999b).
The latter period is used only as a general reference of
trends, as in these earlier studies the results were
calculated with user prices rather than basic prices, since
the latter were not shown in the original 1977 input-
output tables.10  The present analysis is divided into
two main parts: structural change in gross output and
structural change in industrial interdependence.
1. Structural change in gross output
Table 1 below shows the change both in the share of
industries or services in gross production, and the
growth rates for those activities, for the period 1986-
1996. We begin with the three major productive
sectors: the primary or natural resources sector, the
secondary or manufacturing sector (which includes
construction in the table), and the tertiary (services)
sector.
a) Aggregated analysis
In the three major sectors –primary, secondary and
tertiary– the degree of structural change in gross output
between 1986 and 1996 was similar to that for the
previous decade, but growth rates were significantly
higher. The fall in the share of the primary sector, which
had halted in 1977-1986, resumed during 1986-1996,
with a loss of a further 3.1 percentage points. As a result,
the primary sector represented 16.3% of total gross
output in 1996. In the case of the secondary sector, the
significant increase in 1977-1986 was partly offset,
with a fall of 2.8 percentage points, so that it made up
35.9% of gross output in 1996. The opposite appears
to have happened with the tertiary sector: the
significant fall in its share in 1977-1986 was reversed,
with an increase of 5.9 percentage points, and it
represented 47.8% of total gross output in 1996. All
three sectors showed exceptionally high growth rates
10 We used the 1986 and 1996 input-output tables. The 1996
table, which is the latest available for Chile, was published in
2001 and made available on the Internet in 2002. These tables
were deflated at sectoral levels, where possible, differentiating
between intermediates, value added, final output and total gross
output, at constant 1986 prices. To this end, we used implicit
deflators from the national accounts.
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over this period, especially the tertiary sector, which
appeared to have lagged well behind the other two
sectors during the 1977-1986 period.
For the economy as a whole, the only demand
component that seems to have contributed positively
to the changes in the participation of the different
sectors over 1986-1996 was a significant improvement
in direct intermediation, represented by the input-
output coefficients (IOC). This means that input demand
for the output of all sectors, especially the secondary
and tertiary sectors, made a positive contribution to
both the growth rates and the shares of those sectors in
the economy. All the other factors show negative
contributions to shares of output, especially final
demand expansion (FDE), import substitution of final
goods (ISF) and import substitution of intermediate
goods (ISW). Even export demand expansion –the most
important positive contributor in 1977-1986– now
showed a negative contribution. Domestic demand and
exports, and to a lesser extent intermediation, appear
to have made the greatest contributions to the high
average growth rate (see table 1). Only import
substitution held back the average growth rate, but in
a small way. These aggregated results, however, hide
the heterogeneous nature of structural change, so that
we will now turn to a disaggregated analysis.
b) Disaggregated analysis
At this level of disaggregation, we will examine
productive activities in the natural resources,
manufacturing or services sectors.
i) The primary or natural resources sector (table
1, lines 1 to 4). For 1986-1996, in contrast to the
previous period, the shares fell for all constituent
industries, especially for the non-mining primary sector,
but remained virtually unchanged for copper. All
industries, especially copper, showed significant
increases in the growth rates of gross output, except
for the fuel industries, which showed a 61% fall. All
industries, however, grew at rates lower than the average
for the economy, which explains their losses in terms
of shares of output. The still-significant growth rates
appear to have responded especially to final demand
expansion (FDE) in the non-mining primary sector and
to export demand expansion (EDE) in mining. The
output fall in the case of fuels seems to have been
mainly caused by massive falls in import substitution,
especially of intermediate goods (ISW). The high growth
rates of copper and other minerals, as expected, were
mostly pulled by export demand, while the
contribution from intermediation was almost nil,
meaning that mining in Chile may have become more
of an enclave industry than before. Contrary to the
previous (1977-1986) period, the non-mining primary
sector had a reasonably high growth rate contribution
from intermediation, which may mean that these
industries were better integrated in the overall economy
than before.
To sum up, the copper industry retained a share in
gross output similar to that in 1986, but with a
significantly higher growth rate, probably because of
significant support from policy measures over the
period. In 1996, its share in total output was over 6%,
which was good news for both overall growth and
foreign exchange generation. Second, the average
growth rate in the non-mining primary sector was
practically double that for the period 1977-1986.
Domestic demand and exports, as well as
intermediation, played an important role in this
recovery. Third, intermediation improved for the non-
mining primary sector and consequently for fuels,
while it worsened somewhat for copper and other
minerals. While agriculture and associated industries
appear to have become more integrated into the overall
economy, extractive industries moved somewhat in the
opposite direction, or lagged behind.
In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), mining
increased its share between 1996 and 2000, while the
non-mining primary industry (except for fishing) fell
significantly; as a result, the participation of the overall
primary sector was about the same in 2000 as in 1996
(Banco Central de Chile, various years). The primary
sector as a whole was therefore growing at a similar
rate to that of the economy as a whole, but with some
internal structural changes. GDP relates only to the final
demand component of gross output, but unlike gross
output it is calculated at market rather than basic prices,
including transport costs, wholesale margins and net
indirect taxation. Hence, the growth rate and structure
of GDP may provide a general picture of the behaviour
of gross output over the same period, but this will not
be confirmed until updated input-output tables are
made available by the Central Bank.
ii) The secondary or manufacturing sector (table
1, lines 5 to 19). During the 1977-1986 period, the
manufacturing sector increased its share of total gross
output, but only because of light industries, since heavy
industry –the most technologically advanced part of
the secondary sector– saw a decline in its share. Both
fell, however, during the 1986-1996 period: light
industry by 3.2 percentage points and heavy industry
by 1.5 points. For light industry, the main source of
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TABLE 1
Chile: Growth rates and changes in the share of gross output,
by production activity and sector, between 1986 and 1996 a
(Basic prices in constant 1986 pesos)
Share δ = (1996-1986) Growth rate: ∆ = (1996-1986)
Production activity and sector δX/X96 FDE EDE ISF ISW IOC S86 ∆X/X86 FDE EDE ISF ISW IOC
1 Non-mining primary -1.6 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 1.0 7.8 75 40 26 -2 -8 19
2 Copper -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 117 9 110 -1 0 -1
3 Fuels -1.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 0.1 1.2 -61 38 19 -21 -107 10
4 Other minerals -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 3.9 103 20 88 -1 0 -3
5 Food -3.3 -3.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 1.0 10.5 52 25 19 -3 -4 14
6 Textiles -0.9 -0.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 1.5 -13 3 17 -24 -14 6
7 Clothing 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 1.6 127 81 19 -17 -6 50
8 Lumber/wood -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.6 101 48 49 -2 -3 9
9 Paper/printing 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.0 167 72 32 -7 -4 76
10 Leather 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 648 366 76 8 -6 203
11 Rubber -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 37 14 35 -30 -3 20
12 Chemicals -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 2.5 112 63 39 -12 -6 29
13 Oil refining -0.9 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 2.7 47 45 28 -12 -5 -9
14 Non-metals 0.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.7 1.7 198 122 30 -6 -15 67
15 Metals 0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.6 -0.3 0.3 3.1 132 93 69 -31 -13 15
16 Machinery -0.7 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 0.4 2.4 60 85 28 -57 -23 28
17 Transport equipment -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.2 1.3 78 118 39 -88 -10 19
18 Other manufactures -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 102 20 24 7 18 34
19 Construction 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 6.2 187 177 5 -1 0 5
20 Public utilities 0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.9 2.7 157 75 39 -4 -3 51
21 Commerce, restaurants and hotels 3.4 3.3 0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 12.2 183 159 26 -2 1 -2
22 Finance 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 217 193 27 -2 0 -1
23 Business services/real estate 2.4 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 3.5 7.5 192 98 22 -3 1 73
24 Transport 1.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.0 6.9 155 83 50 -2 1 22
25 Communications 1.4 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 483 373 53 -3 -2 62
26 Public administration -1.9 -1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 20 19 0 0 0 1
27 Education/health -1.6 -1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.5 44 41 0 0 0 3
28 Other services 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.6 124 52 7 -1 5 61
I Primary sector (1-4) -3.1 -1.5 -1.0 -0.3 -1.2 0.9 19.4 86 25 66 -2 -10 7
   
Non-mining (1) -1.6 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4 1.0 7.8 75 40 26 -2 -8 19
Mining (2-4) -1.5 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -0.1 11.6 94 16 93 -3 -11 -1
II Secondary sector (5-18)b -2.8 -3.4 0.4 -3.4 -1.5 5.2 38.7 105 77 27 -14 -6 20
Light industry (5-10) -3.2 -4.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.5 2.9 17.8 82 43 25 -6 -5 24
Heavy industry (11-19) -1.5 -0.8 0.8 -2.6 -0.9 2.1 14.8 99 77 39 -29 -10 22
III Tertiary sector (20-28) 5.9 -0.5 0.4 -0.6 0.1 6.4 41.9 153 106 25 -2 1 23
Total/averagec 0.0 -5.4 -0.3 -4.3 -2.6 12.5 100.0 121 79 34 -7 -4 19
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Banco Central de Chile (1993 and 2001a).
a BP : Basic prices.
δX/X : Change in share of gross output (=∆S) (percentage points).
∆X/X : Gross output growth rate (%).
FDE : Final demand expansion (percentage points).
EDE : Export demand expansion (percentage points).
ISF : Import substitution of final goods (percentage points).
ISW : Import substitution of intermediate goods (percentage points).
IOC : Change in input-output coefficients (percentage points).
S86 : Share of gross output in 1986 (%).
b The secondary sector (manufactures) includes construction.
c Figures in bold type are totals; figures in italics are weighted averages.
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this fall was textiles, which showed negative growth
rates over the period, and the food industry, whose
growth rate was well below the averages for both the
secondary sector and the economy as a whole. In heavy
industry, the growth rates were all very positive,
although mostly below the average for the economy.
The main branches which lost shares were oil refining
and machinery, but also chemicals, transport equipment
and other manufactures. In contrast, non-metal and
metal industries saw above-average growth rates with
slight increases in their share of total gross output.
Construction continued its upward trend with a growth
rate well above the average for the period, increasing
its share by 1.8 percentage points.
The factors contributing positively to growth rates
were domestic demand and exports, but also direct
intermediation, especially for the clothing, paper and
printing, non-metal and machinery industries. In turn,
the factor with a negative contribution to growth was
import substitution11  of both final and intermediate
goods, especially for the rubber, metal, machinery and
transport equipment industries. There was apparently
less domestic capacity to produce these goods, and
therefore more import penetration. From the viewpoint
of changes in output shares, the lower-than-average
growth rates for most industries in this sector translated
into falls in their shares over the period. All the
constituent factors, except for intermediation (IOC) and,
to a lesser degree, export expansion (EDE), contributed
to this result. Except for metal-working industries, the
contribution of export expansion to the share of the
secondary sector was stagnant or negative. In simple
terms, this means that the contribution of exports to
growth rates, even if positive, was below the average
for the whole economy. For the construction sector,
there was a continuous upward trend in its share, so
that it represented nearly 8% of total gross output in
1996. As expected, this increase was mostly due to
domestic demand expansion, but also to direct
intermediation to some extent.
In short, the first point to note is that the share of
the heavy-industry sector underwent a relative, rather
than absolute, decline, especially in industries such as
oil refining, machinery, transport equipment and other
manufacturing, although there was a slight rise in metal
and non-metal industries. Second, although the
declines are mostly attributable to overall import
penetration, there was a considerable contribution from
direct intermediation, which prevented the decline from
being larger. There was also a small positive
contribution from export expansion. Third, the light-
industry sector, as a whole, experienced a fall in its
share of total output, despite high growth rates in most
segments (except for textiles). Fourth, this fall was
mostly due to import penetration and to weaker-than-
average domestic demand and export expansion. Fifth,
there was also a significant contribution from direct
intermediation. This could mean that secondary sectors
were better integrated with the rest of the economy
than before, but it was probably mostly due to import
penetration (see below). Sixth, in relative terms, there
was generalized de-industrialization in both light and
heavy industry. The former had shown a positive share
trend in 1977-1986, which seems to have been largely
undone over the 1986-1996 period. Lastly, the
construction sector maintained an upward trend as a
result of increased domestic demand.
From 1986 to 1996, in GDP terms, there was a
significant decline in the share of manufacturing of
about 4 percentage points, with a further percentage
point lost by 2000. This was because growth rates in
the secondary industries were below the average for
the whole economy, although they were not negative,
except in the case of textiles. There are also some
indications that this relative loss was not accompanied
by productivity increases (Mujica, 1989; Ominami,
1991; Pizarro, Raczynski and Vial, 1996). For an
economy that expects to achieve an export-led type of
sustainable development, this could be worrying
(Ffrench-Davis and Sáez, 1995; Albala-Bertrand, 1999a).
iii) The tertiary or services sector (table 1, lines
20 to 28). In the 1986-1996 period, in contrast to 1977-
1986, most of the constituent industries of this sector
increased their shares in gross output significantly. The
main industries accounting for these gains include
commerce, restaurants and hotels, business services and
real estate, transport, and communications. This was
to be expected in any economy that had undergone
high GDP growth over a particular period. However, this
result is attributable not so much to the expansion in
demand as to the large increase in the share of direct
intermediation over the period, although this positive
performance was partly counterbalanced by some
import penetration of final goods. There was still some
ground for concern, as both public administration and
education and health were well below average growth
rates, with significant falls in their shares of total gross
output.
11 For the way in which the contribution of import substitution
was calculated here, see note 8.
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To sum up, first the service sector’s share increased
impressively between 1986 and 1996, reversing a large
fall in the previous period. Second, most of this
outstanding performance was due to direct
intermediation. Third, public administration and
education/health showed very weak growth rates and
a significant decline in shares, which could represent
grounds for concern, as both are basic to a country’s
efficiency, i.e., to the coordination and productivity of
the economy and society.
In GDP terms, the share of the services sector grew
still further between 1986 and 1996, by around 3
percentage points. Commerce grew significantly,
recovering from its fall in the previous period, and the
same occurred with transport and, especially,
communications. This was partly the result of the
considerable entry of telecommunications companies
over the period (Moguillansky, 1999). Finance
remained more or less constant at the relatively high
levels of 1986, with average growth rates close to those
of GDP. The privatization and proliferation of pension
funds may have contributed to this result, but the
significant inflows of short-term capital were also a
factor (Uthoff, 2001). In GDP terms, both public
administration and education/health systematically
lagged behind the average growth of the economy, not
only between 1986 and 1996, but also in 2000 (Banco
Central de Chile, various years).
Despite good growth rates over the period, it seems
that the economy still did not favour the most
technologically sophisticated sectors. Both light and
heavy industry showed growth well below the average
rate for the economy, losing ground in relation to
services. Of the most technologically advanced
industries, as classified by Wyckoff and Sakurai (1992),
only metal and non-metal industries appear to have
made some gains in output shares; rubber, machinery,
transport equipment and other manufacturing all
appear to have lagged behind. Finance, however,
registered growth rates well above the average, which
is normally considered a necessary complement to
technological progress.12
In conclusion, despite the fall in the share of the
secondary sector and the relative fall in the
contribution of export expansion, the most interesting
development over the period was the widespread
increase in direct intermediation in the economy as a
whole. This means that economic activities are
currently more integrated than ever before, but it may
also mean that the economy is now more sensitive to
partial shocks. In other words, a recessive shock in one
sector may have stronger negative repercussions on
the rest of the economy than in the past. Nonetheless,
one should consider whether this increase in direct
interdependence can be attributed to the interplay of
domestic productive activities or to imported input
penetration. For this reason, in the following
paragraphs we will look at the issue of overall industrial
interdependence in 1986-1996 and focus on direct and
indirect backward and forward linkages.
2. Structural changes in industrial
interdependence
The level and quality of industrial interdependence or
linkages have much to do with development. Increased
use of efficient inputs is associated with an increasingly
complex economic system, that is, one in which
production involves more cycles of intermediation or
interdependence, as in the developed countries. There
is also a positive correlation between linkages and final
output (table 2). In some industries, apparently, an
increase in intermediate linkages is followed by an
increase in their final output, especially for
manufactured exports and heavy or more sophisticated
manufactures (Chenery and Syrquin, 1986).
Table 2 shows the rates of change (or growth rates) of
backward linkages (∆BL/BL), and forward linkages (∆FL/FL)
for the 1986-1996 period, decomposed into domestic
(DOM) and imported (IMP) contributions, both in constant
1986 basic prices.
a) Backward linkages (BL)
By way of illustration, in the backward linkage
section of table 2, under the heading “BL86” in the
left-hand section, the value 2.1 for copper means that
to produce one unit of copper (with a constant value
equivalent to one peso) for final demand, a total of 2.1
units of direct and indirect intermediate-inputs are
needed. The normalized value of BL for the same year
and sector, under the heading “NBL86”, shows a
number smaller than one, meaning that the backward
linkages of the copper industry are below the average
for the economy, which is to be expected as this is a
“demand enclave”, i.e., it generates little demand for
inputs from other sectors. That value also shows average
homogeneity, as it has an approximately average
coefficient of variation. In 1996, the main leading or
pulling sectors were mainly food and textiles, together12 See also Albala-Bertrand (1999a).
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TABLE 2
Chile: Growth rates of backward and forward linkages, by production activity
and sector, between 1986 and 1996a
(Basic prices in constant 1986 pesos)
Backward linkages Forward linkages
Production activity and sector ∆BL/BL(86) D O M IMP BL86 NBL96 CV96 SFD86 ∆FL/FL(86) D O M IMP FL86 NFL96 CV96 SV86
1 Non-mining primary 23 13 9 1.9 0.95 2.5 5 15 6 9 2.0 0.52 3.0 8
2 Copper 3 -3 6 2.1 0.88 2.7 9 -1 -3 2 1.2 0.27 4.9 5
3 Fuels 90 32 58 2.1 1.62 2.2 0 545 -89 633 7.7 11.19 1.4 1
4 Other minerals 5 0 5 1.4 0.57 3.6 5 2 -3 5 1.4 0.33 3.5 5
5 Food 40 24 16 2.6 1.47 2.1 13 28 19 9 1.4 0.41 3.9 5
6 Textiles 97 36 61 2.4 1.86 2.2 1 134 52 83 2.4 1.27 1.9 2
7 Clothing -4 -15 11 2.6 0.99 2.3 2 80 46 34 1.2 0.47 2.7 1
8 Lumber/wood 48 37 11 2.1 1.23 2.0 2 16 4 12 2.1 0.54 2.5 2
9 Paper/printing -2 -7 5 2.1 0.83 2.5 1 44 20 24 2.2 0.69 1.8 1
10 Leather -40 -37 -3 1.9 0.45 4.7 0 33 16 17 1.7 0.52 2.2 0
11 Rubber 41 18 23 1.8 1.02 2.4 1 82 23 58 2.5 1.04 1.6 1
12 Chemicals 8 1 6 2.2 0.95 2.9 2 30 6 25 4.1 1.20 1.4 3
13 Oil refining 61 -1 62 2.9 1.87 2.0 1 30 -19 49 3.3 0.95 1.7 3
14 Non-metals 23 5 19 2.1 1.05 2.3 0 17 -1 18 2.8 0.74 2.1 2
15 Metals 0 -11 11 2.1 0.83 3.1 2 8 -25 33 3.1 0.76 2.1 3
16 Machinery 24 6 18 1.4 0.72 3.3 2 79 7 72 2.7 1.09 1.4 3
17 Transport equipment 30 8 22 1.6 0.82 3.2 1 60 7 53 2.6 0.92 1.8 2
18 Other manufactures 19 3 16 2.2 1.04 2.1 1 55 33 22 2.0 0.71 1.7 1
19 Construction 31 16 15 2.1 1.08 1.9 8 -3 -12 9 1.4 0.30 3.9 5
20 Public utilities 37 13 24 1.9 1.06 3.0 1 19 -9 28 2.6 0.69 2.6 2
21 Commerce, restaurants and hotels 19 10 9 1.8 0.83 2.7 13 -7 -20 13 1.8 0.37 3.4 13
22 Finance 23 17 6 1.9 0.93 2.7 1 -12 -32 20 2.3 0.45 3.1 1
23 Business services/real estate 15 9 6 1.4 0.64 3.5 7 31 1 30 2.0 0.59 2.1 10
24 Transport 17 4 13 2.2 1.02 2.5 6 14 -23 38 2.2 0.57 2.6 7
25 Communications 16 17 0 1.4 0.67 3.6 1 -11 -27 15 2.2 0.44 3.1 1
26 Public administration 44 31 14 1.8 1.01 2.0 7 1 1 0 1.0 0.23 5.1 5
27 Education/health 34 25 9 1.4 0.77 2.7 7 4 2 1 1.0 0.24 4.9 6
28 Other services 23 14 9 1.7 0.85 2.5 2 77 70 7 1.3 0.50 2.4 2
I. Primary sector (1-4) 9 2 7 1.9 1.01 2.9 19 41 -5 46 2.0 3.08 3.9 20
II. Manufactures: Light (5-10) 36 19 17 2.5 1.14 2.4 20 46 23 23 1.8 0.65 3.0 12
Heavy (11-18) 23 2 21 2.0 1.04 2.9 10 41 -3 43 3.1 0.92 1.7 16
Construction (19)b 31 16 15 2.1 1.08 1.9 8 -3 -12 9 1.4 0.30 3.9 5
III. Services (20-28) 25 15 10 1.7 0.87 2.8 44 10 -8 18 1.8 0.45 3.2 47
Averagec 25 12 12 2.0 1.00 2.6 100 25 -3 28 2.0 1.00 2.9 100
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Banco Central de Chile (1993 and 2001a).
a BP : Basic prices.
∆ : Variation.
DOM : Domestic (percentage points).
IMP : Imported (percentage points).
BL : Backward linkages (pesos).
NBL : Normalized backward linkages (pesos).
CV96 : Coefficient of variation in 1996 (pesos).
SFD : Share in domestic final demand (percentage points).
FL : Forward linkages (pesos).
NFL : Normalized forward linkages (pesos).
CV96 : Coefficient of variation in 1996 (pesos).
SV : Share in value added (percentage points).
b The secondary sector (manufactures) includes construction.
c Sum of SFD86 and SV86.
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with fuels and oil refining, although the latter two
started from a very low base, as their share of GDP in
1986 was small or negligible. The main lagging sectors
are other minerals, leather, machinery, business services
and real estate, communications, and education and
health. Given the importance of imported inputs in
most of the leading industries, especially oil refining,
and the key role of such inputs in most other sectors,
this could have negative consequences for the country’s
productive integration.
In 1986-1996, following a trend similar to that of
the 1977-1986 period, backward linkages increased
on average by a further 25%. This means that when the
economy produced 100 units of final domestic output,
this generated on average nearly 25 more units of
backward intermediate demand in 1996 than in 1986.
This was due in particular to increases in the backward
linkages of construction and light industry. However,
a good deal of the increase came from imported
intermediation, especially in heavy industry. On the
whole, imported and domestic intermediates appear to
share the increase in equal terms, although, in heavy
industry, this increase is led by imported, rather than
domestic, materials. This was also the trend in the
previous period, but it appears less intense in 1986-
1996. This may have consequences for both foreign
vulnerability and endogenous technological
development (Albala-Bertrand, 1999b).
At a disaggregated level, we can observe that,
firstly, for primary industries, it seems that the rises in
backward linkages are mostly due to fuels and
secondarily to non-mining primary industries. In the
case of fuels, there was a significant increase in both
domestic and imported intermediation, but generally
it was the latter which carried most weight. Copper
–in contrast with the 1977-1986 period– showed a very
small increase of 3%, due to a fall in domestic
intermediation by three percentage points and a rise in
imported intermediation by six percentage points.
Secondly, the backward linkages of the light
industrial sector, which had shown a significant fall in
the 1977-1986 period, registered a sizeable increase
in 1986-1996, mainly due to food and textiles.
Clothing, paper and printing and leather, however,
showed declines due entirely to significant falls in
domestic intermediation.
Thirdly, heavy industries showed a significant
average increase in backward linkages, but almost
completely due to imported intermediation. The
strongest positive effects came from rubber, oil refining,
transport equipment and machinery, with only a minor
contribution from domestic sources. Metal industries,
for their part, showed zero growth, due entirely to the
substitution of imported for domestic inputs by 11
percentage points. Construction showed more balanced
intermediation than the other sectors.
Lastly, the tertiary sector showed an increase in
backward linkages, with a more important contribution
from domestic than from foreign sources, except in the
case of transport.
The main point here is that although imported
intermediation represented 50% of the total change, this
proportion rose to nearly 90% in the most
technologically sophisticated part of the economy. All
the constituent industries of the heavy industrial sector
were strongly affected by this imported input penetration.
This may conspire against endogenous sustainability,
but it should preserve the competitiveness of the
industries that use more sophisticated imported inputs.
The open Chilean economy, then, is moving towards
greater reliance on imported inputs for its normal
productive requirements. In the 1977-1986 period there
was a decline in domestic backward intermediation,
which was then considered as reflecting a process of
generalized disintermediation (see Albala-Bertrand,
1999b), but this appears to have been reversed in most
industrial activities, except heavy industry.
Quite apart from its implications for employment,
the increase in imported backward linkages can only
directly benefit foreign exporters and domestic
importers, and therefore has little or no positive effect
on endogenous productive interdependence between
industries. From this point of view, the potentially
positive results of an increase in the demand for inputs
would have an impact both outside the economy, on
foreign exporters, and on the trade of domestic
importers, but they would be of little help to domestic
productive manufacturing. This could be insufficient
for the development of domestic manufacturing.13
b) Forward linkages (FL)
In similar fashion to what occurs with backward
linkages, an economy with a growing and dynamic
industrial base would be expected to have a broad,
strong supply of domestic intermediate goods. This of
course does not preclude firms increasing their output
to satisfy both final and export demands provided that,
13 As in the extreme case of an assembly-line manufacturing
economy which only assembles parts produced abroad but
purchases those parts from domestic importers belonging to
other sectors.
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other things being equal, they do not do so on a
widespread and intensive basis at the expense of
domestic input supply (Albala-Bertrand, 1999b).
During the period studied, total forward linkages grew
at the same rate as backward linkages, but the whole of
this increase was due to growth in the domestic supply
of imported inputs, which also displaced three
percentage points of the existing supply of inputs of
domestic origin. If we exclude the two industries (fuels
and textiles) which showed the highest variation in
forward linkages, the increase is more moderate, but
keeps the same pattern. There was a generalized fall in
forward intermediation of domestic origin, so the
growth in input supply was due to an increase in the
supply of imported inputs, at the expense of domestic
supply. In other words, increases in value added created
opportunities for suppliers of imported inputs, rather
than domestic producers.
This may mean that, in practice, a fair number of
domestic producers gave up the possibility of
supplying the internal market with domestic products,
in favour of marketing imports. This trend had already
been apparent in the 1977-1986 period, when almost
all the industries considered showed negative
intermediation from domestic sources. In 1986-1996
that trend continued to some extent: for a good number
of sectors the change in domestic intermediation was
negative, while that of imported input supply was
positive. Except for light industry, all other sectors
showed negative contributions from domestic
intermediation. The worst-affected sectors were fuels,
metals, finance, transport and communications. This
indicated both a consolidation of the domestic
disintermediation seen in the previous period and a
further departure from the type of domestic integrative
process experienced in the Taiwanese economy and
the Republic of Korea (Albala-Bertrand, 1999b). As
with backward linkages, this represents a generalized
process of domestic disintermediation.
A general conclusion for both backward and
forward linkages is that this intense import penetration
can have mixed consequences for the development of
a growing economy. On the one hand, the economy
can select the most efficient foreign sources for its input
requirements and use inputs that are more
technologically sophisticated, which may be
beneficial. On the other hand, the economy may become
more vulnerable to external fluctuations, which can
lead to increased instability (Damill, Fanelli and
Frenkel, 1996; Chang and Grabel, 2004). No less
importantly, the economy may lose an important degree
of efficiency by not exploiting the domestic
synchronization of the necessary inputs and their
specifications, thus stifling the potential for domestic
technological development. The avoidance of this
anomaly, associated with deliberate input policies,
proved to be one of the main engines of efficient
coordination between the needs of industry and supply
from domestic producers in the Taiwanese and Korean
economies, which also helped to improve domestic
technological sophistication.14  This factor appears to
have been further eroded in Chile over the 1986-1996
period, and also, in general, up to 2000 (Banco Central
de Chile, various years), which may have had negative
consequences for sustained, technologically advanced
growth. In other words, in order for Chile to take full
advantage of its potential for efficiency and
technological development –as the Taiwanese
economy and the Republic of Korea did– access to
varied foreign input sources must be balanced with the
nurturing of sources of domestic inputs. Given that
there are costs and benefits involved in liberalization
and regulation strategies, policymakers need to strike
a delicate balance between the two in order to ensure,
or at least not suffocate, the endogenous sustainability
of increased domestic technological sophistication and
the efficiency associated with inter-industry
coordination.
14 See Kubo, de Melo and others (1986); Wyckoff and Sakurai
(1992); Chang (1996); Stiglitz (1996); Albala-Bertrand (1999b);
Islam and Choudhury (2000); Chang and Grabel (2004).
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IV
Conclusions
Up to 1986, Chile appeared to have departed from, or
at least not moved towards, the kind of successful
industrial structure that the Taiwanese economy and
the Republic of Korea had achieved some 15 to 20
years after the beginning of their rapid drive to
development (Albala-Bertrand, 1999a and 1999b).
Almost 20 years after its fully-fledged economic
liberalization began, the structure of the Chilean
economy does not appear to have closed the gap with
the two Asian countries. If anything, it seems to have
fallen further behind, especially in the area of
endogenous technological sophistication. This may
have long-term consequences in terms of technological
development, sustainable development and the overall
stability of the economy.
ECLAC data show that, as late as 1996, the share of
manufacturing in GDP was around 20% and that of heavy
industry around 2%. Likewise, the share of exports in
GDP was around 25%, but that of manufacturing exports
was only 3%, while the share of heavy manufacturing
in GDP remained negligible. This pattern continued until
2000 and does not seem to have changed significantly
to date (ECLAC, various years). Given that the Chilean
economy slowed significantly or was in recession after
1996, with an average growth rate around half of that
achieved in the previous 10 years, it is unlikely that
domestic intermediation has increased or that
sophisticated manufacturing has taken hold.
Furthermore, these insufficiencies can have negative
impacts on income distribution, anti-poverty measures,
and overall well-being, or at least delay improvements
in those areas.15
Therefore, other successes notwithstanding, the
economic development model adopted by Chile still
does not appear to favour endogenous interdependence,
especially of the type led by technologically
sophisticated sectors. Neither does it appear to be
leading towards the type of exports that can sustain
and promote dynamic export-oriented industrial
development. In other words, the economy still appears
to be relatively weak as a basis for a sustainable increase
in economic and technological sophistication.
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